that normally includes all the bug fixes in the maintenance release, and is normally a superset of the code in the corresponding maintenance version. We may add changes (new features) to the -S edition between maintenance releases that we do not add to a maintenance release of the public edition. We support only one -S edition release on any given branch. When we start producing an -S edition on a new branch, we continue to support the -S edition on the prior branch for at least another six months to support migration. BIND Subscription Edition Release Plan (updated as of September 9, 2024) 24 Q2 24 Q3 24 Q4 25 Q1 25 Q2 25 Q3 25 Q4 26 Q1 26 Q2 26 Q3 26 Q4 27 Q1 27 Q2 27 Q3 27 Q4 28 Q1 BIND 9.16-S stable EOL BIND 9.18-S stable ESV ESV, vulnerabilities only

Introduction This document describes how to migrate a Kea database from one MySQL/MariaDB server to another. Assumptions The following assumptions are made in this document: The operator has access to the database server (credentials, privileges, etc.) Both database servers are running MySQL or MariaDB The database software version(s) are the same or compatible The user name used by Kea to access the database is the same Scheduled downtime for maintenance For best results, the same database software version on both hosts is ideal. Any differences in database server software version risk introducing incompatibilities. However, as long as the new software is sufficiently compatible with the old, it should work. The user name Kea uses to access the database must be the same on both old and new hosts. This identity is stored in the database as the "definer" and changing it will cause errors. This procedure is somewhat

A maliciously configured name server can trick a resolver into caching false no-such-name responses for long periods of time. CVE:  [CVE-2003-0914](http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2003-0914) CERT:  [VU#734644](http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/734644) Posting date:  04 Feb 2004 Program Impacted:  [BIND](https://www.isc.org/software/bind) Versions affected:  All versions prior to 8.4.3 and 8.3.7, except some vendor-only releases Severity:  Serious Exploitable:  Remotely Description:  An attacker would configure a name server to return authoritative negative responses for a given target domain. Then, the attacker must convince a victim user to query the attacker's maliciously configured name server. When the attacker's name server receives the query, it will reply with an authoritative negative response containing a large TTL (time-to-live) value. If the victim's site runs

CVE: CVE-2018-5741 Document version: 1.0 Posting date: 19 September 2018 Program impacted: BIND Versions affected: The behavior described is present in all versions of BIND 9 which contain the krb5-subdomain and ms-subdomain update policies prior to our upcoming maintenance releases, BIND 9.11.5 and 9.12.3. However, the misleading documentation is not present in all versions. Severity: Medium Exploitable: Remotely, but only by an attacker with credentials to modify other records on the server. Description: To provide fine-grained controls over the ability to use Dynamic DNS (DDNS) to update records in a zone, BIND 9 provides a feature called update-policy . Various rules can be configured to limit the types of updates that can be performed by a client, depending on the key used when sending the update request. Unfortunately, some rule types were not initially documented, and when documentation for them

you have used -g as we did. root:/etc/namedb# named -g & [1] 22438 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.844 starting BIND 9.9.1-P1 -g 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.844 built with '--prefix=/usr/local/bind-9.9.1-P1' 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.844 ---------------------------------------------------- 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.844 BIND 9 is maintained by Internet Systems Consortium, 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.844 Inc. (ISC), a non-profit 501(c)(3) public-benefit 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.844 corporation. Support and training for BIND 9 are 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.845 available at https://www.isc.org/support 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.845 ---------------------------------------------------- 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.845 using 1 UDP listener per interface 11-Jun-2012 16:28:25.845 using up to 4096 sockets 11-Jun-2012 16:28

Like many basic Internet protocols, DHCP was not originally designed with a robust security model, but was designed for simplicity of implementation and ease of deployment. Care should be taken in networks that use DHCP to avoid common security pitfalls. Problem 1: Rogue DHCP Servers A substantial part of the appeal of DHCP is that clients joining a network require no a priori knowledge of the network. They advertise (via a DHCPDISCOVER packet) to find a DHCP server and, assuming all goes well, receive their configuration information from that server and join the network as fully functioning clients. While this is very desirable behavior as far as ease of deployment is concerned, from a security standpoint it is problematic that client machines, having no pre-existing knowledge of the network, cannot distinguish between a response from a server which is authorized by the network's administrator and another machine which

Rather than break the zone, the older key may continue to be used, with sufficient notification in the log files to indicate this is happening. During the key rollover period there will be a difference in zone size as a result of the DNSKEY record set being larger for a longer period of time.

the trust anchors on a regular basis and uses the algorithm described in RFC 5011 to update both the keys and their status. Progress of the Rollover As BIND updates the keys, the configuration file is not changed. Instead, BIND writes updated key information to files in BIND's working directories (specified with the directory and/or managed-keys-directory options in your configuration file). You can check the progress of the rollover by looking at these files or, more conveniently, executing the rndc secroots (all versions of BIND) or rndc managed-keys status (BIND 9.11 and later) commands. Initially, assuming that you don't have any trust anchors other than a current root key configured, executing the rndc managed-keys status output should result in something like:     name: . keyid: 19036 algorithm: RSASHA256 flags: SEP next refresh: Tue, 23 May 2017 16:21:37 GMT trusted since: Mon, 22

题目： 特意构造的DNS数据可导致服务器被锁定 摘要： 特意构造的资源记录数据 一旦被引入域名服务器，可导致该服务器被锁定。 CVE : CVE-2012-5166 文档版本 ：2.0 发布日期 ：2012年10月9日 受影响软件 ：BIND 软件版本 ：9.2.x -> 9.6.x, 9.4-ESV->9.4-ESV-R5-P1, 9.6-ESV->9.6-ESV-R7-P3, 9.7.0->9.7.6-P3, 9.8.0->9.8.3-P3, 9.9.0->9.9.1-P3 严重程度 ：高危 可利用方式 ：远程 描述 ： 如果特定组配的RDATA被载

the PARTNER-DOWN state. You can put the server into the PARTNER-DOWN state either by using the omshell (1) command or by stopping the server, editing the last failover state declaration in the lease file, and restarting the server. If you use this last method, change the "my state" line to: failover peer name state { my state partner-down;. peer state state at date ; } It is only required to change "my state" as shown above. When the other server comes back online, it should automatically detect that it has been offline and request a complete update from the server that was running in the PARTNER-DOWN state, and then both servers will resume processing together. It is possible to get into a dangerous situation: if you put one server into the PARTNER-DOWN state, and then *that* server goes down, and the other server comes back up, the other

Do I need a journal on secondary servers? The journal reduces the cost of rewriting complete zone files; basically, the IXFR gets appended to the journal when it occurs. For BIND 9.11 and earlier, we recommend setting the journal size to some modest non-zero size (64KB to 1MB). If you have any large frequently-updated zones, they might benefit from a bigger journal to reduce zone file rewrites. There's a minimum journal size (approximately 1KB), so even if you set max-journal-size to 0 (or any other tiny value) it is rounded up to the minimum. Starting in BIND 9.12, max-journal-size is automatically set based on the zone size, so you should be able to remove any max-journal-size settings from your configuration.

Posting date : 14 March 2018 Program impacted :  BIND Versions affected : 9.0.x -> 9.8.x, 9.9.0->9.9.11-P1, 9.10.0->9.10.6-P1, 9.11.0->9.11.2-P1, 9.12.0->9.12.0-P1 Description "update-policy local;", which is a permission cluster provided as a shortcut for operators who use Dynamic DNS (DDNS), was misleadingly named in that its original implementation did not actually enforce a requirement that the updates it allows originate locally. A full description of "update-policy local;" is included in Section 6.2 of the BIND Administrator Reference Manual, but to briefly summarize: When "update-policy local;" is set for a zone in named.conf , named will create and use an automatically generated session key (named "local-ddns" by default and stored in local storage on the server) and will permit updates to the zone

CVE: CVE-2018-5743 Document version: 2.0 Posting date: 24 April 2019 Program impacted: BIND Versions affected: BIND 9.9.0 -> 9.10.8-P1, 9.11.0 -> 9.11.6, 9.12.0 -> 9.12.4, 9.14.0. BIND 9 Supported Preview Edition versions 9.9.3-S1 -> 9.11.5-S3, and 9.11.5-S5. Versions 9.13.0 -> 9.13.7 of the 9.13 development branch are also affected. Versions prior to BIND 9.9.0 have not been evaluated for vulnerability to CVE-2018-5743. Severity: High Exploitable: Remotely Description: By design, BIND is intended to limit the number of TCP clients that can be connected at any given time. The number of allowed connections is a tunable parameter which, if unset, defaults to a conservative value for most servers. Unfortunately, the code which was intended to limit the number of simultaneous

appends the zone $ORIGIN. Increment the serial number of the zone, to ensure a flawless zone transfer to your slave servers after reloading the zone on your master. If you had frozen the zone in step 1, thaw it now by issuing this command: rndc thaw Reload the zone file by issuing this command: rndc reload Again, after reloading the zone, the TXT record should become available. Dynamically Updating your DNS Zone to add the DKIM Public Key In scenarios where you intend to maintain a large number of DKIM keys published or if your operation uses Dynamic Updates for your DNS zone maintenance, it is possible to use this mechanism to manage your DKIM public keys with ease. This scheme requires fewer steps and can be easily integrated in automated provisioning schemes. First, you must ensure that you'll be able to add the DKIM public keys. You'll

NB: This document is retained for historical interest only as "named" and "dig" have supported TLS natively since BIND release 9.17.7. RFC 7858 specifies DNS over TLS (Transport Layer Security). There are multiple ways to implement DoT. One implementation example, which uses nginx, is provided in the contrib directory of the BIND 9 distribution, entitled 'dnspriv'. This is documented at https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/. This article explains how to provide a DNS over TLS service using BIND 9 and stunnel .  The setup of a privacy aggregator is at the end. BIND 9 configuration: nothing special, but if you want to limit external insecure access to the service you can play with  listen-on clause address and port,  acl , or even a system firewall as BIND 9 provides no per-transport protocol access control. stunnel setup for the opportunistic privacy profile: Create a X.509 public key certificate, for

network failure that breaks the connection will not result in the servers being out of communication for a long time, but large enough that the server isn’t constantly making and breaking connections. This parameter must be specified. The max-unacked-updates statement max-unacked-updates count ; The max-unacked-updates statement tells the remote DHCP server how many BNDUPD messages it can send before it receives a BNDACK from the local system. We don’t have enough operational experience to say what a good value for this is, but 10 seems to work. This parameter must be specified. The mclt statement mclt seconds ; The mclt statement defines the Maximum Client Lead Time. It must be specified on the primary, and may not be specified on the secondary. This is the length of time for which a lease may be renewed by either failover peer without contacting the other

The BIND versions listed in this article are EOL This BIND 9 Security Vulnerability Matrix is a record of vulnerabilities affecting the EOL BIND 9.9 Supported Preview branch during (or very shortly after) its lifetime. It is known to be affected by some vulnerabilities discovered after the EOL date (July 2018) but those will not be listed here. This article has two parts: The first part is a table listing all of the vulnerabilities covered by this page. The first column is a reference number for use in the tables in the second part. The second column is the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure) number for the vulnerability, linked to its page on cve.mitre.org . The third column is a short description of the vulnerability, linked (where possible) to our Knowledgebase article on the vulnerability. The second part is a table listing all of the releases in this

to be placed in the netadmins group as well. This may change in a future release of Stork. User Access Optionally, you can limit Stork logins to a particular LDAP group. STORK_SERVER_HOOK_LDAP_GROUP_ALLOW If defined, Stork login will be allowed only for members of the specified LDAP group. You must provide the Common Name of the group (without CN= prefix). Use this if not all LDAP users should be permitted login to Stork. For example, if you have an LDAP group netadmins , you might specify that here, and then only your network admins will be able to login to Stork. This is independent of the group mapping feature ( MAP_GROUPS ). You can restrict Stork login without mapping Stork roles. You can map Stork roles without restricting Stork login. However, it often makes the most sense to use both features together. Group Mapping Optionally, you can

Title:  Memory Leaks Found In ISC DHCP Summary: Two memory leaks have been found and fixed in ISC DHCP. Both are reproducible when running in DHCPv6 mode (with the -6 command-line argument.) The first leak is confirmed to only affect servers operating in DHCPv6 mode, but based on initial code analysis the second may theoretically affect DHCPv4 servers (though this has not been demonstrated.) CVE:   CVE-2012-3954 Document Version:  2.1 Posting date:  24 July 2012 Program Impacted:   ISC DHCP 4 Versions affected:  4.1.x, 4.2.x Severity:  Medium Exploitable:  From networks permitted to send requests to the DHCP server. Description: ISC has discovered and fixed two memory leaks in the DHCP code. One of the leaks only affects servers running in DHCPv6 mode. The other is known to affect a server running in DHCPv6 mode but could potentially occur on servers running in DHCPv4 mode

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